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Abstract
We investigate how multinational two-sided platform rms set their
prices on intra rm transactions. Two-sided platform rms derive
income from two customer groups that are connected through at least
one positive network externality from one group to the other. A main
nding is that even in the absence of taxation transfer prices deviate
from marginal cost of production. A second result of the paper is that
it is inherently di¢ cult to establish arms length prices in two sided-
markets. Finally, we nd that di¤erences in national tax rates may
be welfare enhancing despite the use of such prices as a prot shifting
device.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided platform rms derive income from two customer groups that are
connected through at least one positive network externality from one group
to the other. A platform rms pricing to each customer group reects these
externalities and therefore does not follow standard rules of pricing where
marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Two-sided platform rms operate
in some of the most economically signicant industries such as the nan-
cial sector (card holders and merchants), the computer business (software
developers and end users), and the media business (viewers/readers and ad-
vertisers). They are also internationally oriented. In the media business,
for example, some of the most successful newspapers and TV channels have
US, Asian and European versions of their products with independent entities
located abroad providing the needed tailoring.1
In this paper we investigate how multinational two-sided platform rms
set their prices on intra rm transactions. In the absence of taxes, we nd
that network externalities between two customer groups lead to a transfer
price that di¤ers from the marginal cost of production. International tax
rate di¤erentials may lead the transfer price to deviate even further from
cost of production considerations. We also show that the transfer price may
di¤er across importing countries depending on the strength and direction of
network externalities making it in general very di¢ cult to establish what the
arms length price is in two-sided markets. We show these results in a model
where we let a¢ liates of a multinational rm be monopolists in order to
purely focus on the tax e¤ects at play. We model two-sidedness by allowing
one network externality between the two groups of customers in order to
bring forward the basic mechanism at play.
Our analysis is related to a growing literature in Industrial Organization
that analyzes the price-setting behavior of rms in two-sided markets. In
1For example BBC Europe and BBC USA (and CNN Europe and CNN US) and the
newspapers Wall Street Journal with its US and European editions.
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this literature a key result is that the pricing decisions in two-sided platform
rms do not follow conventional pricing rules.2 For example, an increase in
marginal costs on one side of the market does not necessarily imply a higher
price on that side of the market relative to the price on the other side. This
is in contrast to conventional markets (one-sided) where marginal cost equal
to marginal revenue pricing is well established as a guidance. In one-sided
markets the e¤ects of taxation are also well known both under perfect and
imperfect competition. To the best of our knowledge there does, however,
not exist any paper on two-sidedness and transfer pricing.
Our paper also relates to the literature on transfer pricing in one-sided
markets. This literature nds substantial evidence for tax-motivated trans-
fer pricing and that transfer pricing depends on di¤erences in statutory tax
rates.3 Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the ag-
gregate reported protabilities of U.S. a¢ liates in di¤erent foreign locations
in 1982. Both studies nd strong indirect evidence for transfer pricing in
that high taxes reduce the reported protability of local operations. Collins,
Kemsley and Lang (1998) study a pooled sample of U.S. multinationals and
nd that normalizedreported foreign protability exceeds U.S. protability
among rms facing foreign tax rates below the U.S. rates. In Europe, We-
ichenrieder (1996) presents evidence that German rms have taken advantage
of the low Irish tax rate in the manufacturing sector by shifting the returns
to nancial assets (passive income) to its subsidiaries in Ireland. Subse-
quent German tax legislation that restricted the ratio of passive to active
income that could be earned in a foreign country led to a shift from nancial
to real investment in Ireland, in order to relax the new constraint. Lan-
gli and Saudagaran (2004) study small and medium sized foreign controlled
corporations in manufacturing, wholesale and retail industries in Norway in
the period 1993-96 using simple regression techniques. They nd that these
2See for instance Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004).
3For a survey of this literature, see Hines (1999).
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rms report consistently lower taxable income than domestically controlled
corporations.
In presenting our model, Section 2 sets out the basic model while section
3 investigates transfer pricing incentives. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a multinational (parent) platform rm (MNC) that is headquar-
tered in country i and owns subsidiaries in j = 1; :::; n countries. The parent
rm produces two goods, good a is sold worldwide by the parent rm whilst
good x is sold to each a¢ liate j at transfer price qj. Each a¢ liate deter-
mines how much of good x it purchases by maximizing its own prot. How
much each a¢ liate buys from the parent is then a function of the transfer
price and local market conditions. We shall assume that both the parent
rm and the a¢ liates are monopolists in their respective markets, and that
production costs are zero. Both assumptions are widely used in the literature
and are known to bring forward the tax incentives of transfer pricing without
a¤ecting the results qualitatively.4
A¢ liate j sells good xj, where the (inverse) demand function is pj = p(xj),
and pays a transfer price qj (per unit sold) to the parent rm. Good x and
good a are linked by a positive externality from consumption in the following
manner: @p
A(x1;:::;xn;a)
@xj
> 08j. This means that the willingness to pay for good
a is rising in the sale of good x. The parent rm derives revenue from the
sale of good a and good x, but incur convex concealment costs C(qj), if the
transfer price deviates from the true cost of production (i.e., if qj 6= 0). The
cost function has the standard properties of C(0) = 0 and C 0(qj) > 0 if
qj 6= 0.
Corporate tax rates di¤er across countries (ti 6= tj) and we assume that
4Note that in this setting the arms length price would be zero reecting that this is
the marginal cost of production.
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the exemption method is in place. This is a reasonable assumption since it
is widely used in most OECD countries and it implies that repatriated prot
income is exempt from taxation.
Prots by the parent rm after corporate taxes are
Hi = (1  ti) 
(
pA(x1; :::; xn; a)  a+
X
j
qj  xj  
X
j
C(qj)
)
; (1)
whereas the after tax prots of an a¢ liate j are
j = (1  tj) fpj(xj)xj   qjxjg : (2)
Optimal Quantities Each a¢ liate determines how much it sells in its
local market by maximizing
max
xj
j (3)
and the rst order condition to this maximization problem is
@pj
@xj
 xj + p(xj)  qj = 0 ) xj = xj(qj); (4)
which can be written on elasticity form as
p(xj) 

1 +
1
jx;p

= qj; (5)
where jx;p =
@xj
@pj
pj
xj
is the price elasticity of demand for good xj.
Comparative statics on equation (4) yield
@xj
@qj
=
1
@2pj
@x2j
+ 2  @pj
@xj
< 0; (6)
where the denominator is negative from the second order condition of the
maximization problem.
5
The parent rm determines the optimal quantity of good a by maximizing
max
a
Hi (7)
and associated rst order condition is
@pA
@a
 a+ pA(x1; :::; xn; a) = 0 ) a = a(x1(q1); :::; xn(qn)): (8)
3 Transfer Pricing
The optimal transfer price qj in country j follows from maximizing MNCs
world-wide prots after taxation , that is
max
qj
 = Hi (q1; :::qn) +
X
j
j(qj);
Inserting for the prot function values we maximize
 = (1  ti) 
(
pA(x1(q1); :::; xn(qn); a
)  a +
X
j
[qj  xj(qj)  C(qj)]
)
+
X
j
(1  tj) fpj(xj(qj))  xj(qj)  qj  xj(qj)g : (9)
The rst order conditions are given by
(1  ti) 

@pA
@xj
 @xj
@qj
 a + qj  @xj
@qj
  C 0(qj)

+(tj   ti) xj(qj) = 08j: (10)
In order to determine a benchmark result we shall assume the absence of
any network externalities and that taxes are equal (ti = tj). In this case the
rst order conditions above reduce to
qj  @xj
@qj
  C 0(qj) = 0 ) qj = 08j: (11)
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With su¢ ciently convex concealment costs it is straightforward to show
that equation (11) can only be satised if qj = 0. Thus, in the absence of
any externality or tax motive for transfer pricing the rm sets a price equal
to marginal cost of production. This is in fact the transfer price that would
have been chosen between independent parties in a competitive economy.
In the presence of the network externality, but with equal taxes, the rst
order conditions become
@pA
@xj
 a + qj

 @xj
@qj
= C 0(qj) 8 j (12)
from which it is seen that qj < 0 as long as
@xj
@qj
< 0, because C 0(qj)  0.
The transfer price is now below the marginal cost of production since each
a¢ liate neglects the positive externality that the sale of good xj has on the
sale of good a. In order to remedy this failure the parent rm sets a subsidy
that internalizes the externality between the two customer groups.
This result extends and strengthens an argument made by Hirshleifer
(1956), who examines optimal transfer pricing rules in various settings, but
in absence of taxation. The optimal transfer price normally equals marginal
costs of the intermediate product, as long as demand independence prevails.
However, in case of technological dependence (i.e., the output levels of
related products a¤ecting each othersproduction costs), he states that in-
ternalizing this kind of interactions calls for subsidies or taxes on the
transfer price causing a deviation from (pure) marginal costs. However, he
neither formally shows this nor rigorously proofs it. With respect to transfer-
pricing, two-sidedness and its externalities on the willingness to pay, running
from one customer group to the other, can be seen as analog to technological
dependence. Our analysis shows formally, how these externalities should be
incorporated in the optimal transfer-price and thereby conrms the conjec-
ture in Hirshleifer (1956, section F).
Note that in our set-up the transfer price chosen in the absence of taxes as
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given by equation (12) is (potentially) welfare-enhancing because it increases
the quantities sold of good a and of good xj:5 Transfer pricing is normally
considered to be harmful or at best neutral (if there is no tax motive), but
as demonstrated here the cost of tax evasion should be weighed against the
benet of lower prices and a larger quantity sold.
Examining the tax motive and the externality motive together, the (im-
plicit) formula for the optimal transfer price is
C 0(qj)
xj
=
qj
xj
@xj
@qj


1 +
pA  a
qj  xj
 x

j
pA
@pA
@xj

+
tj   ti
1  ti 8 j: (13)
In line with most of the literature and without consequence for our quali-
tative results let the concealment costs be quadratic in the transfer price and
linear in the quantity sold, that is C(qj) =
q2j
2
 xj. Using this in equation
(13) , we obtain
qj = xjqj 

1 +
pA  a
qj  xj
 pAxj

+
tj   ti
1  ti 8 j; (14)
where xjqj =
qj
xj
@xj
@qj
represents the transfer price elasticity of good xj and
pAxj =
xj
pA
@pA
@xj
can be interpreted as the elasticity of complementarity be-
tween willingness to pay for good a and sales of good xj.
As can be seen from equation (14) the transfer price will in general di¤er
from marginal cost even when taxes are equal. In particular, the higher the
transfer price elasticity (xjqj), the more negative is the transfer price. The
size of the transfer price also depends positively on the network externality
(pAxj). A large network externality means a large distortion on the transfer
price relative to the marginal cost of production. As seen from (14), the tax
saving motive may go in the opposite direction of the network externality
e¤ect bringing the price closer to marginal cost.
5In fact, the network externality can even cause oversupply of both goods compared to
the social optimum, as will be argued later.
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In general, our analysis shows that a positive externality will lead to a
downward pressure on the transfer price relative to its true price. Sim-
ilarly, it is straightforward to show that a negative externality would have
the opposite e¤ect. In some two-sided markets, several externalities could be
present at the same time, and it is then the combined interactive e¤ect of
these that determines the inuence on the transfer price.
The OECD model double tax convention states that the arms length
price is the price that would have been chosen between independent trading
parties. In the presence of network externalities, this approach causes at least
three problems. First, two-sided platform rms exist because they internalize
externalities between two customer groups. Such rms do not in general trade
with each other due to the nature of the business they are in. This makes
it hard to determine a market price. Second, in such markets it is unlikely
to observe rms that only serve one customer group, since the very fact
that two-sided platform rms exist in a market is an indication of that this
is a superior mode of business. Third, examining the price of transactions
between two customer groups in di¤erent platform rms is also an odd basis
for establishing the market price since our analysis shows that such prices
are rm specic and depend on the size and direction of the externalities in
question.
Another interesting result that follows from equation (14) is that despite
the presence of prot-shifting, a tax-distorted transfer price may have a pos-
itive e¤ect on welfare. Kind et al (2008) show that a two-sided monopoly
platform rm may produce too much of both goods compared to the social
optimum when there are positive intergroup externalities. In the model by
Kind et al (2008) there is no prot shifting motive at play. As our analysis
has shown, introducing transfer pricing will increase the possibility of over-
supply if the tax rate di¤erential has the same sign as the network externality,
since this would lower the transfer price even further. However, if interna-
tional di¤erences in tax rates (and thus the motive of prot shifting) work
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against the network externality, prot-shifting will ceteris paribus increase
the transfer price and, consequently, mitigate the oversupply problem.
It is straightforward to show the e¤ect of changes in either tax rate on
the transfer price. In particular, we obtain
dqj
dtj
=   x

j=(1  ti)
@pA
@xj
 a + qj

 @2xj
@q2j
+

1 +
tj ti
1 ti

 @xj
@qj
  C 00(qj)
> 0; 8 j(15)
dqj
dti
=
(1  tj)xj=(1  ti)2
@pA
@xj
 a + qj

 @2xj
@q2j
+

1 +
tj ti
1 ti

 @xj
@qj
  C 00(qj)
< 0; 8 j; (16)
because the denominator in both expressions is negative from the second
order condition for an optimal transfer price qj.
Recall that the parent rm produces two goods, where good a is sold
worldwide by the parent rm whilst good x is sold to each a¢ liate j at
transfer price qj. The parent rm faces the tax rate ti so an increase in tax
rates facing the a¢ liates (tj) means that it becomes more protable to shift
prot to the parent rm, which is done by overinvoicing the transaction.
Similarly, a higher ti means that it has become more attractive to shift prot
to the a¢ liates by underinvoicing.
Finally, we can dene j =
@pA
@xj
 a as the magnitude of the externality
and interpret an increase in j either as a shift in preferences for good a or
as an increase in the network externality between goods a and xj. The e¤ect
on the transfer price of a change in j is
dqj
dj
=   @xj=@qj
@pA
@xj
 a + qj

 @2xj
@q2j
+

1 +
tj ti
1 ti

 @xj
@qj
  C 00(qj)
< 08 j (17)
where the negative sign follows from @xj
@qj
< 0, equation (10), and the neg-
ativity of the second order condition. The intuition is that if the marginal
willingness to pay for good a is rising in the amount sold of good xj, then
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it pays for the multinational rm to let the parent rm subsidize the sale of
good xj by selling at an even lower transfer price qj.
Note that the magnitude of the externality and the elasticity of comple-
mentarity pAxj will vary between countries, making the rm set di¤erent
transfer prices across countries. These international di¤erences need not re-
ect di¤erences in international tax rates but may be entirely due to the
di¤erences in demand across countries. This goes to show that it is not easy
to establish what the correct transfer price is even in the absence of taxation.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has demonstrated that multinational two-sided platform rms set
transfer prices that deviate from the marginal cost of production even in the
absence of taxation. We also show that the transfer price may be welfare
enhancing even if di¤erences in national tax rates give rise to prot-shifting.
If the tax rate di¤erential mitigates the externality e¤ect, the total e¤ect
on welfare is ambiguous. Nevertheless, it may be that reducing (potential)
oversupply overcompensates losses from tax-evasion.
Out of our analysis also comes the insight that in the absence of taxa-
tion the transfer price on the same transaction will di¤er across countries
depending on the strength of demand specic network externalities between
customer groups. According to the OECD double tax convention: . . . the
correct transfer price is the price that would have been chosen if the transac-
tion had occurred between independent agents in the market place . . . (i.e.,
the arms length price).6 Our analysis points to that in two-sided markets
arms length prices may be di¢ cult or even impossible to establish. There
are several reasons for this. First, two-sided platform rms may nd it prof-
itable to charge prices that are below marginal cost or even negative for one
product (customer group). Second, in such markets where the transfer price
6OECD double taxation convention, 1977.
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serves to internalize the externality between customer groups, there may not
exist market parallels that can be used, and if they did exist, they could be
from rms serving only one customer group (i.e., a one-sided market rm).
Such rms face very di¤erent pricing incentives and cannot be used for price
comparisons.
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